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OF PRINCIPLE AND PRUDENCE: ANALYZING THE F.B.I.’S RELUCTANCE
TO ELECTRONICALLY RECORD INTERROGATIONS
© 2013 Kristian Bryant Rose
“Believe nothing you hear, and only one-half that you see.”1
Edgar Allan Poe
I. Intro
On a wintery December night in 1980, three men—Bob Mitchell, Malcolm Harris,
and Richard Farmer—drove to Clark Garvin’s home to purchase cocaine.2 Finding
Garvin away, Mitchel kicked in the door, entered the house, and stole two pounds of
marijuana, cocaine, a set of drug scales, and $14,000 in traveler’s checks.3 Though the
drugs were immediately usable, the unendorsed traveler’s checks presented a problem of
illiquidity. In what can only be described as a stroke of petty-criminal ingenuity, Harris
forged Garvin’s signature, counterfeited an Alaska birth certificate in Garvin’s name, and
obtained a matching state identification card.4 Harris then flew to Seattle where he
proceeded to fraudulently cash most of the checks.5
More than five years prior to Harris’ case, the Alaska Supreme Court held in Mallott
v. State that due process under the Alaska Constitution required the electronic recording
of police interrogations.6 The officers who obtained Harris’ confession employed “a
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Edgar Allan Poe, The System of Doctor Tarr and Professor Fether, CLASSIC READER,
http://www.classicreader.com/book/1394/1/ (last visited July 13, 2013).
2
Harris v. State, 678 P.2d 397, 399 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984), rev’d sub nom. Stephen v. State, 705 P.2d 410
(Alaska 1985).
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Id.
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608 P.2d 737, 743 n.5 (Alaska 1980).
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working audio or video recorder . . . during part, but not all, of the interrogation. . . . [and]
offered no satisfactory excuse for their clear disregard of the Mallott rule.”7
At trial, a jury of Harris’ peers found sufficient evidence to convict him to an eight
year sentence and included restitution penalties in the amount of $7,000.8 On appeal,
Harris’ attorney successfully challenged the admissibility of Harris’ confession to police.9
The appellate court remanded the case for retrial with instructions to suppress the
statements.10
Depending on one’s perspective, this outcome might appear either a triumphant
preservation of essential due process, or, alternatively, a damnable waste of judicial,
police, and taxpayer resources. Such diametrically opposed views perfectly capture the
controversy regarding the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (“F.B.I.” or "the Bureau")
policy of discretionary interrogation recordation.
Currently, the F.B.I. maintains a policy that generally precludes electronically
recording interrogations and interviews of suspects.11 Instead, the Bureau relies on “302
reports,” whereby an agent transcribes, by hand, what is said during an interview.12 This
practice is not without exception, however. In certain circumstances, the Special Agent in
Charge of a field office may exercise discretion to allow the recording of an interview.13

7

Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156, 1158 (Alaska 1985).
Harris, 678 P.2d at 399.
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United States v. Filler, No. 8-10396, 2000 WL 123446, at *1 (9th Cir. Feb. 1, 2000) (No. 98–10396)
(referenced in a “Table of Decisions Without Reported Opinions” appearing at 210 F.3d 386).
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Harvey Silvergate, Constructing Truth: The FBI’s (Non)recording Policy, FORBES.COM (July 27, 2011,
2:12 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/harveysilverglate/2011/07/27/constructing-truth-the-fbisnonrecording-policy/
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Memorandum from the Fed. Bureau of Investigation Office of Gen. Counsel to all Field Offices at 1627,
1630 (Mar. 23, 2006). Prescribed discretionary factors include: (1) the purpose of the interview; (2) type
and seriousness of the crime, including the presence of a mens rea element; (3) whether defendant’s own
words and appearance would help rebut doubt about the voluntariness of statements made; (4) the
sufficiency of other available evidence; (5) the preference of the U.S. Attorney’s office and the applicable
8

2

A discretionary allowance appears particularly likely where the partnering United States
Attorney or applicable Federal District Court requires such recording.14
These discretionary exceptions notwithstanding, a growing body of academic
literature suggests concern for the improvidence and due process implications of refusing
to record custodial interrogations.15 Part II of this comment argues: (1) that due process
under the United States Constitution does not require the electronic recording of custodial
interrogations, (2) that video footage fails to achieve maximum evidentiary objectivity,
and (3) that courts should leave to law enforcement the freedom to determine
investigative best practices. Part III explores the prudence of adopting a policy of video
recordation despite a lack of constitutional compulsion. This comment concludes in Part
IV.
II. A Matter of Principle: Due Process Does Not Require the Electronic Recordation
of Custodial Interrogation
The Fifth Amendment to the federal Constitution provides: “No person shall be . . .
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.”16 Miranda v. Arizona stands as the
seminal case establishing a suspect’s procedural protections beginning at the moment of
custody.17 Miranda specifically established police requirements to inform a suspect of

Federal District Court; (6) local laws and practice, particularly if a multi-agency task force is involved and
may lead to state prosecution; (7) whether interviews with related subjects in the investigation have been
recorded; (8) the potential to use the subject as a cooperating witness and the potential value of such
recording; and (9) practical considerations, such as the length of interview, availability of equipment, and
available funds to pay for recording and transcription services. Id. at 1630.
14
See id.
15
See, e.g., Tracy Lamar Wright, Let’s Take Another Look at That: False Confession, Interrogation, and
the Case for Electronic Recording, 44 IDAHO L. REV. 251, 251-53 (2007); Daniel Donovan & John Rhodes,
Comes a Time: The Case for Recording Interrogations, 61 MONT. L. REV. 223, 223-27 (2000).
16
U.S CONST. amend. V.
17
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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his constitutional rights upon arrest.18 However, the Court later clarified that the use of
these “prophylactic” measures was simply a way to ensure the full substantive Fifth
Amendment right.19 That discussion bears great weight on the issue of modern electronic
recordings during interrogation.
Some have argued that to enforce due process, “recording is constitutionally
necessary” as a “remedy for false confessions.”20 Proponents for recording occasionally
look to other democratic countries such as Great Britain, Canada, and Australia,
observing that each requires recording for custodial interrogations.21 In the end, however,
reformers must confront the reality that, within the United States, the overwhelming
majority of jurisdictions reject such a requirement.22
A. Due Process: A Moving Target or a Statued Sentiment?
If the constitutional text makes no mention of electronically recording interrogations,
and the Supreme Court has not yet addressed the issue, then just what does due process
require of police with respect to the way they handle interviews? First, it might be
helpful to address, very briefly, the modern jurisprudential disagreement about what due
process the Constitution generally requires. Specifically, does constitutional “due
process” incorporate modern contextual realities, or does it simply protect citizens in the
same principled way it did when drafted? The divergent answers to that question might

18

Id. at 478-79.
See, e.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 305, (1985) (“The prophylactic Miranda warnings therefore
are ‘not themselves rights protected by the Constitution but [are] instead measures to insure that the right
against compulsory self-incrimination [is] protected.’”).
20
Donovan & Rhodes, supra note 15, at 230-31.
21
Id. at 231.
22
Id. at 232.
19
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be termed “originalism” and “dynamism.”23 The originalist view of substantive due
process is well-articulated by Justice Antonin Scalia:
I will not apply so-called Substantive Due Process in the future . . . .
That means that there are all sorts of new rights that would otherwise
be created that I will leave to the democratic process. . . . The
Framers were trying to set a bar below which the society cannot go.
They didn’t believe that every day we get better and better—the
‘evolving standards of decency that mark the evolution of a maturing
society.’ They understood that societies not only mature—they
sometimes rot. And they were trying to set a bar to prevent that
rotting. To understand it in any other way, to mean whatever some
future society wants it to mean, is to deprive it of all its effect.24
Consistent with Justice Scalia’s view, inferring a suspect’s right to have interrogations
video recorded would represent a false extrapolation of the Fifth Amendment’s original
meaning. Rather than grant a new right, an originalist would simply enforce the baseline
due process protection in light of its historical context.
Alternatively, other jurists, such as the late Justice Felix Frankfurter, view due
process as necessarily evolving with time and culture.
“[D]ue process,” unlike some legal rules, is not a technical
conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and
circumstances. . . . “[D]ue process” cannot be imprisoned within the
treacherous limits of any formula. Representing a profound attitude
of fairness between man and man, and more particularly between the
individual and government, “due process” is compounded of history,
reason, the past course of decisions, and stout confidence in the
strength of the democratic faith which we profess. Due process is not
a mechanical instrument. It is not a yardstick. It is a process. It is a
delicate process of adjustment inescapably involving the exercise of
judgment by those whom the Constitution entrusted with the
unfolding of the process.25
23

William N. Eskridge, Jr, Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional Law in the
Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2363 (2002).
24
Jerry de Jaager, Justice Scalia Comes Home to the Law School, RECORD ONLINE, Spring 2012,
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/alumni/magazine/spring12/scalia (emphasis added).
25
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 US 123, 162-63 (1951) (Frankfurter, concurring)
(emphasis added). Justice Scalia’s remarks addressed Substantive Due Process, while Justice Frankfurter
spoke primarily of Procedural Due Process. These are two sides of the same coin, however, and one might
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Where Justice Scalia’s originalism cautions restraint in creating new rights under due
process, Justice Frankfurter’s dynamic and expansive view dictates that the Court must
respond to shifting realities within which the state exercises its power. Justice Burke of
the Alaska Supreme Court echoes Justice Frankfurter’s perspective. In writing the
majority opinion for the landmark case Stephan v. State, Justice Burke stated: “The
concept of due process is not static; among other things, it must change to keep pace with
new technological developments.”26
B. The Undivided Circuits: Due Process Does Not Require Electronic Recordation
Regardless of which jurisprudential philosophy ultimately prevails, the United States
Circuit Courts of Appeals have spoken with complete unanimity on this question. When
asked whether due process requires the recording of interrogations, their answer resounds
clearly and with consistent pitch: no.
The issue emerged as early as 1977 when the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals took up
the question in United States v. Coades.27 In Coades, the appellant urged the court to
suppress testimony of an F.B.I. agent because the agent had not electronically or
stenographically recorded his interrogation.28 Appellant proffered no authority to support
his position, and the court opted for judicial restraint, explaining: “The need for the rule
reasonably argue that mandatory video recording could fall on either side. It seems perhaps most in line
with Miranda, which specifically addressed procedural due process. Quite like Miranda, the government’s
electronic recording would arguably create a more advanced prophylactic protection of the Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination. Although Justice Scalia’s originalist sentiment in note 22,
supra, addressed substantive due process, his dissent in Dickerson v. United States, placed the same
emphasis on procedural due process. There, he criticized the Court’s “judicial overreaching” when deciding
ex post that a violation of Miranda was a violation of the Constitution. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S.
428, 455, 465 (2000). In part, Justice Scalia reasoned that history fails to support such an expansive view of
procedural due process as applied to the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 447. Whether video recordation is
classified ultimately as a substantive or procedural due process issue, the originalist and dynamist will
maintain the same essential disagreement.
26
711 P.2d 1156, 1161 (1985) (incorporating an affirmative state constitutional requirement that police
record interrogations).
27
549 F.2d 1303, 1305 (9th Cir. 1977).
28
Id.
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suggested by appellant and the particular form such a rule should take are appropriate
matters for consideration by Congress, not for a court exercising an appellate function.”29
The Ninth Circuit continues to maintain this view, as evidenced in the 2003 case, United
States v. Huber.30 There, appellant argued that “for Miranda . . . to have any teeth, an
electronic recording must be made.”31 While the court acknowledged possible benefits of
a recording policy, it found “no legal basis for imposing such a requirement.”32
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals likewise held in Brown v. Mckee that “[n]either
federal nor Michigan law requires suppression solely on the basis that a police
interrogation was not electronically recorded.”33 In that case, a defendant alleged that the
interrogator failed to read his Miranda rights and unlawfully coerced a confession.34
Because no electronic record of the interrogation was preserved, the defendant argued,
the evidence should have been excluded.35 Citing cases from the Sixth and Tenth
Circuits, the court refused his motion to suppress.36
In 1991, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals considered whether an F.B.I. agent was
required to tape record statements elicited during interrogation when well equipped to do
so.37 The court noted the potential wisdom of recording interrogations, but ultimately
held that it was not constitutionally required.38 In so holding, the court acknowledged a
trial court’s prerogative to accept the credible testimony of a federal agent over and
29

Id.
66 Fed. App’x. 123, 124 (9th Cir. 2003).
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
231 Fed. App’x. 469, 475 (6th Cir. 2007).
34
Id. at 473.
35
Id. at 475.
36
Id.; see also United States v. Gray, No. 3:09 CR 182, 2010 WL 1487218, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 13,
2010) (holding that the Sixth Circuit has consistently refused to recognized a federal right of recorded
interviews, and that where the F.B.I. only preserved an interview through 302 reports, “arguments as to the
lack of electronic recording [were] without merit”).
37
United States v. Short, 947 F.2d 1445, 1451 (10th Cir. 1991).
38
Id.
30
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against that of a criminal defendant, even in the absence of electronic recordings.39 Again
in 1999 the court found “no Supreme Court precedent (or, for that matter, any other court
precedent)” that due process required electronically recorded interrogations.40
As a final example of the far reaching and unanimous federal appellate voice
declaring no due process right to an electronically recorded interrogation, consider an
appeal of a military court martial in the 2007 case United States v. Jarvis.41 There,
appellant contended that an investigator’s failure to record his inculpatory statements
violated his due process rights. The court applauded the well-constructed argument,
stating:
Trail [sic] defense counsel filed an exceptional motion at trial
arguing that “[t]o fully protect a service member's Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights, the time has come to apply a bright line,
constitutionally based, prophylactic rule: an unreasonable failure to
electronically record the entirety of a suspect's interrogation violates
the suspect's constitutional rights and renders any statement
purportedly obtained from such interrogation inadmissible.”42
However, because “[n]o [such] requirements exist under either federal law or the United
States Constitution,” the court “decline[d] to extend such a rule to military courtsmartial.”43 To date, a court from every federal circuit has issued at least one opinion
holding no due process right to the electronic recording of custodial interrogations.44
Because the Circuit Courts maintain complete agreement on the matter, it is extremely

39

Id. (“In ruling against Defendant at the suppression hearing, the court obviously felt the Government's
witnesses were more credible than the defense witnesses.”).
40
Trice v. Ward, 196 F.3d 1151, 1170 (10th Cir. 1999).
41
United States v. Jarvis, No. ACM 36502, 2007 WL 2300889, at *4 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. May 31, 2007).
42
Id. at *1.
43
Id.
44
See, e.g., United States v. Meadows, 571 F.3d 131 (1st Cir. 2009); United States v. Boston, 249 Fed.
Appx. 807 (11th Cir. 2007); United States v. Tykarsky, 446 F.3d 458 (3d Cir. 2006); United States v.
Williams, 429 F.3d 767 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Montgomery, 390 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 2004);
Yang Feng Zhao v. City of New York, 656 F. Supp. 2d 375 (S.D. N.Y. 2009); United States v. Faultry, No.
H-05-00109, 2006 WL 1544512 (S.D. Tex. June 1, 2006).
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unlikely that the Supreme Court will even address the question. Therefore, criminal
defendants desiring an electronic recording of their confessions will not soon find
comfort beneath due process.
Federal district court judges should recognize this precedential reality and limit their
unsolicited criticism accordingly.45 Justice Thurgood Marshall aptly counseled that
“[j]udges are not free, in defining ‘due process,’ to impose on law enforcement officials
[their] ‘personal and private notions’ of fairness and to ‘disregard the limits that bind
judges in their judicial function.’”46
C. The Ostensible “Objectivity” of Video Footage
Justice Byron White once opined that “the right to an impartial decision-maker is
required by due process.”47 A vocal minority of scholars and practitioners believe that
“recording provides what due process requires.”48 This logic employs a fatal flaw,
however. Video cannot transform a fallible, human decision-maker into an objective
assessor of truth. It simply changes the basis for subjective bias. As one proponent of
forced recording conceded:
While such vivid sounds and images can provide a great
advantage, some caution may be warranted because recordings
might introduce emotional biases into jury decision making. Even
jurors who seek to be fair-minded have pre-conceived prejudices
and sympathies regarding the appearance (dress, tattoos, hair
styles, clothing, jewelry, race, or physical prowess, for example) as
well as language and culture, which might affect a decision that
should be based on fact and evidence.49

45

See infra Part III.B (quoting Judge James G. Carr’s discontentment with current F.B.I. policy).
United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 790 (1977).
47
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 197 (1974) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
48
Donovan & Rhodes, supra note 15, at 245.
49
Julie Renee Linkins, Satisfy the Demands of Justice: Embrace Electronic Recording of Custodial
Investigative Interviews Through Legislation, Agency Policy, or Court Mandate, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
141, 160 (2007).
46
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Video images undoubtedly present an enhanced perspective to courts as to what
occurred in a given interrogation. It is far from a foregone conclusion, however, that an
enhanced perspective always yields greater impartiality. Imagine a scenario where an
investigating agent bears a striking resemblance to, say, David Beckham: tall, blond,
well-groomed, excellent hygiene, and impeccable style. The suspect, on the other hand,
wears tattoo sleeves all the way up his arms, displays a large Nazi swastika on his chest,
which is visible through an open, black leather vest unobscured by the absence of an
undershirt. Further, he appears to have blood on his face. Would anyone contend that a
juror would not be immediately biased upon viewing the juxtaposition of that dyad?
Additionally, depending on the depth and breadth a particular video can provide,
other biases may emerge:
Studies show that electronic recordings of police interrogations can
have certain biases if not conducted properly. The point-of-view
bias, the most prominent one, suggests that the positioning of the
camera can adversely affect the objectivity of the interrogation and
not provide the police and courts all of the protections discussed.
For example, a video camera that records only the suspect would
not preclude the defense from making a claim that officers outside
the lens of the camera pointed weapons at him, thus coercing a
statement. When the camera focuses solely on the suspect, the
amount of pressure placed on him can be underestimated.50
Fully eliminating such inherent gaps and biases would essentially require a panoramic
view of the entire custodial space, including simultaneous coverage of each participant’s
face—agents and suspects alike. Incorporating that level of coverage would surely
minimize the natural biases created by video recording, but would also increase the cost
of implementation to preposterous levels.

50

Brian Parsi Boetig, David M. Vinson & Brad R. Weidel, Revealing Incommunicado: Electronic
Recording of Police Interrogations, FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL., Dec. 2006, at 1, 7-8 (vol. 75, no. 12).
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Even assuming an agency’s ability to purchase and position the most comprehensive
and state-of-the art equipment (a dubious assumption indeed), there still exists a
fundamental problem with presenting video evidence as the great hope for juror
objectivity. “Nearly all evidence presented by attorneys at trial is ‘prejudicial’ in the
sense that it is offered to induce the jury to reach a decision unfavorable to one’s
opponent.”51 That truth will remain constant despite whatever marginal increases in
objectivity electronic recording might deliver. In the final analysis, all evidence will be
prejudicial in some sense, and, in fact, is used by every attorney for that very purpose!
That is not to say that video evidence renders juror decisions less objective. Rather, video
will simply change the subjective basis upon which jurors decide.
Still, some advocates for mandatory recording encourage courts, in the name of due
process, to adopt each and every technological innovation that emerges. Julie Renee
Linkins, a law professor and former F.B.I. employee, suggests that “courts should not feel
reluctant to adopt a technological advance that will aid truth telling and fact finding, just
as they adopted various forensic advances in times past.”52 This reasoning presents a
frightening future when taken to its logical conclusion. While the proposal might be an
acceptable principle in measure, the consequence of courts agreeing to adopt en masse all
new truth-telling technological advances for the sake of due process, which Linkins
seems to advise, looms both costly and invasive. Presume, for instance, that science could
produce a reliable truth-telling serum.53 Should courts then automatically require its
administration to all testifying agents and investigators as a component of constitutional
51

SHEILA K. WYATT, COLORADO EVIDENCE LAW § 403:3 (2012) [hereinafter COLORADO EVIDENCE LAW]
(vol. 23 of West’s Colorado Practice Series).
52
Linkins, supra note 49, at 171.
53
See generally Linda M. Keller, Article, Is Truth Serum Torture?, 20 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 521 (2005)
(discussing truth serums and their various uses in criminal investigations).
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due process because it facilitates greater transparency? Certainly not! Or presume
nanotechnology54 became affordable and scalable to the point that the government could
implant each federal officer with a real time video transmitter. Would such an Orwellian
surveillance be justified under color of due process in order to protect citizens’ rights?
The concept of adopting every new technology that portends even a marginal increase in
government transparency as a constitutionally required prophylactic is patently absurd—
particularly for a federal government facing $16 trillion in national debt.55
Consider by analogy another technological innovation that arrived to criminal justice
as a harbinger of complete scientific objectivity: hair and fiber analysis. Early forensic
reports presented this analysis as a fool-proof safeguard for criminal investigation and
fair trial.56 Today, it is increasingly maligned and lampooned. Michael J. Saks, a
professor of law and psychology at Arizona State University, recently labeled it “faith
based” science.57 Despite its apparent objective value, senior federal-appeals-court judge
Harry T. Edwards observed that "[i]t sounds like there is a lot of impressionistic and
subjective examination going on.”58 Judge Edwards’ comment is somewhat prescient.
Any time new technologies emerge to enhance the ostensible fairness of trials they will
always contain certain fatal flaws. Such is the inherent reality of technology designed and
marshaled by fallible people. In that regard, polygraphs,59 fiber analysis, video

54

See generally Susan W. Brenner, Nanocrime?, 2011 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 39 (discussing the
development of nanotechnology).
55
The Debt to the Penny and Who Holds It, TREASURYDIRECT.GOV,
http://www.treasurydirect.gov/NP/BPDLogin?application=np (last visited Mar. 29, 2013).
56
See Jeffrey Toobin, The CSI Effect: The Truth About Forensic Science, NEW YORKER (May 7, 2007),
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2007/05/07/070507fa_fact_toobin.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
See generally Jeffrey Philip Ouellet, Note, Posado and the Polygraph: The Truth Behind Post-Daubert
Deception Detection, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 769 (1997) (discussing the evidentiary relevance and
admissibility of polygraphs).
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recordings, and truth serums all belong together. Each possesses some potential benefit to
truth finding, and none pays its way into the constitutional requirement of due process.
Finally, even if video could in fact produce a consistently more objective view of
police interrogations, the exposure of the state’s investigative techniques would cripple
police strategy. Though law enforcement might realize some modest value from its
ability to use videos for training and assessment, so might criminals. Every degree of
increased effectiveness that an investigator gains by reviewing “game tape” would
conceivably be counteracted by the criminal watching the same recording. Once
investigative techniques became widely disseminated through video recordings,
sophisticated criminal syndicates would immediately gain access to the state’s
“playbook.” It is not difficult to imagine that career criminals would quickly develop
video-based training modules designed to teach suspects how to “beat the seat” by
counteracting police technique. Additionally, with the knowledge that an interview was
being recorded, a suspect could manipulate juror sympathy by feigning meekness,
confusion, or intimidation for the camera.
D. Deference to Law Enforcement as the Best-Positioned Decision Maker
The United States courts, in conjunction with the Executive branch, maintain the
responsibility for ensuring the full measure of due process for the protection of criminal
suspects. Where no due process right exists, however, courts should concede
investigative policy to law enforcement. In this case, the unanimity of federal holdings
indicates that no constitutional issue exists. Therefore, courts should give law
enforcement broad discretion within the bounds of constitutional due process. Evidencing
an overwhelming rejection of electronic recording, only "a small percentage of the total

13

number” of police agencies nationwide, given the choice, has voluntarily adopted the
policy.60
Proponents for the mandatory recordation policy argue that the electronic record will
decrease police misconduct and disincentivize procedural violations.61 While that may be
so, the constant video monitoring would also create a corollary chilling effect on lawful
police conduct—particularly with aggressive techniques that might offend jurors’
sensitivities. Moreover, the constant electronic monitoring could disrupt suspect rapport
and willingness to talk. “In New York City . . . where the district attorney’s office
conducts recorded interviews in high-profile cases, suspects have been known to become
tense and awkward even after having previously expressed willingness to talk;
introduction of a video camera and technician to run the equipment changes the dynamics
in the room.”62
One of the greatest risks of private interrogation lies in unscrupulous officers’ ability
to abuse suspects through unlawful tactics or physical coercion. However, as Justice John
Marshall Harlan wrote in his dissent to Miranda, “[t]hose who use third-degree tactics
and deny them in court are equally able and destined to lie as skillfully about warnings
and waivers.”63 While some may view video as the cure to Harlan’s unethical officer
problem, in reality it provides only an additional, minimal obstacle. Those capable of
abusing a prisoner or lying about waivers will become equally adept at eschewing
necessary good faith requirements of recording or exploiting other applicable

60

Linkins, supra note 49, at 157-58.
Id. at 150.
62
Id. at 158-59.
63
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 505 (1966).
61
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exceptions.64 Might recording possess the power to reduce opportunity for officer abuse?
Almost certainly, yes. Could the policy cure human depravity and the attendant
inclination to disobey and cheat, which is the essential illness truly at play?
Unquestionably not.
Because the United States Constitution does not require video recording as a
component of due process, courts must defer to law enforcement as the best positioned
decision makers on investigative policy. If time and technological advances have in fact
brought this matter into the realm of constitutional fairness, Congress should recognize
that new reality and reflect its importance in the United States Code.
III. A Matter of Prudence: The F.B.I. Should Adopt a Policy of Electronic
Recording for All Custodial Interrogations
Despite clear and consistent federal court rulings that constitutional due process does
not require the electronic recording of interrogations,65 the F.B.I. should begin
implementing broad video recording programs. Even though the current non-recording
policy passes constitutional scrutiny, the government stands to benefit from voluntarily
utilizing technology during custodial interviews.
A. A Cupertino Culture, Technological Ubiquity, and the CSI Effect
To say that the technological landscape has changed immensely since the time of
Miranda is a gross understatement. In 1966, the year that Chief Justice Earl Warren
delivered the now famous Miranda opinion, the most powerful computer in the world

64

See, e.g., Linkins, supra note 49, at 168 (“Likewise, using electronic recordings to protect the Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination would be subject to logical exceptions for, say, good faith error
or equipment failure, non-custodial interviews, spontaneous utterances, and the like.”) (internal citations
omitted).
65
See supra Part II.B.
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was an IBM System/360 Model 91, owned by NASA.66 It took up the space of an entire
room.67 Today, the average American carries inside his pocket a smartphone with more
computing power.68 In fact, the exponential increase in technological innovation over the
past five years led one commentator to suggest that Apple, Inc.’s latest iPhone 5—which
contains a five megapixel camera capable of holding hundreds of hours of video
footage—simply bored consumers with its seemingly pedestrian specifications.69
Society has become technologically inundated. Average Americans are increasingly
accustomed to complete electronic saturation.70 So much so, in fact, that modern jurors
will likely take for granted a federal investigator’s ability to video record an
interrogation. At least one litigation practice guide notes the courts’ general propensity to
admit highly emotive media into evidence.71 The change has resulted from a general “rise
in ordinary jurors’ exposure to and tolerance for this kind of material in other media.”72
In other words, today’s juries expect media to comprise at least part of their experience in
trial.
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For example, a recent poll of Louisiana jurists demonstrated that every judge
surveyed felt that the popular television show “CSI” had, to some degree, influenced at
least one of their juries.73 Though the academic literature reflects disagreement regarding
the supposed “CSI effect,”74 much of the research is startling.75 The Maryland Supreme
Court examined the “CSI effect” and noted one particular study that “found a significant
positive relationship between viewing crime dramas and the expectation of forensic
evidence in every trial.”76 In some cases, district attorneys feel the need to temper these
juror biases during voir dire by commenting on the possible effects of jurors’ exposure to
popular media.77
The point here is not to divine how television affects juror appetite for forensic
science, but to note a measurable shift in societal exposure to technology and the way it
impacts a criminal trial. Even though due process does not require the video recordation
of custodial interviews, if jurors expect it, the state would do well to provide it. By not
providing video, the state allows jurors to negatively infer—perhaps even
unconsciously—that the omitted footage would have somehow supported the accused.
The constitutional guarantee to a jury is a specific commitment to
allow representatives of the public to make decisions about
individual guilt. As one of the few vestiges of direct democracy in
our system, some regard it as the quintessential example of this
country's democratic ideals. The concept of popular sovereignty in
73
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the United States includes a constitutional commitment that
decisions about justice in individual cases should reflect the values
of popular culture. Contrary to complaints about the effects of
trends in popular culture on criminal juries—even trends perceived
to be the result of a particular television program—the jury system
dictates that those trends will be reflected in individual cases. It is
the government and the judicial system which must respond and
adapt to those trends. Changes in popular culture will continue to
have a “tech effect” on juror expectations of and demands for
scientific evidence. And so they should.78
Juries do not decide what is legally required to fulfill due process. But they do
decide what is practically required. Federal prosecutors must ultimately have the ability
to proffer evidence that jurors find reasonable, regardless of what the law considers
necessary.
What is “reasonable” evidence to expect from the prosecution
today is very different from what it was twenty or even ten years
ago. Ultimately, the legal system leaves the issue of defining
“proof beyond a reasonable doubt” to the jury. They appear to have
decided that today it is reasonable to expect more from the
prosecution in the way of scientific evidence than they have
expected in the past.79
Today’s juries maintain heightened expectations for “scientific” evidence.80 They also
possess modern assumptions about the availability and propriety of technology—in
particular, the commonness of video recordation of important events.81 To the extent that
the federal government continues a counter-cultural policy of unrecorded interrogation, it
will likely meet increasing suspicion and resistance from increasingly technologically
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fluent citizens—most importantly, those twelve very important citizens sitting in the jury
box.82
B. Calls for Reform
In addition to the heightened technological expectations of jurors, the call for
interrogation-policy reform is reaching a fever pitch amongst judges, practitioners, and
academics alike.83 The Innocence Project, a well-known advocate for the falsely
convicted, urges the broad adoption of mandatory recordation policies amongst federal
law enforcement. Their website states: “The electronic recording of interrogations, from
the reading of Miranda rights onward, is the single best reform available to stem the tide
of false confessions.”84 Innocence points to a 2004 Illinois study suggesting that once
implemented, police departments overwhelmingly embrace mandatory recording
policies.85
Thomas P. Sullivan, perhaps the most prolific author on the topic of interrogation
reform, began publishing articles as early as 2003.86 Sullivan notes the irony of such a
modernized federal law enforcement system remaining “sorely out of date” with
interrogations.87 He observed that “[f]ederal agents are familiar with using modern
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electronic equipment [including] wiretap devices and hidden microphones.”88
Accordingly, the “ongoing resistance to recording custodial interrogations is baffling.”89
Sullivan submits that the best avenue for reform lies in congressional action, but that
short of legislation, courts should step in.90 He points to judicial sentiment as a
motivating factor for the change.91 Oklahoma Federal District Court judge S.P. Friot,
once shared in personal correspondence:
I came to the bench three years ago after 29 years in civil practice.
I find it ironic that if the cost of repairing a car is at stake in a civil
case, the defendant's account of the matter (i.e., his deposition) is
meticulously recorded, but agencies with ample opportunity and
resources to do so fail to record statements where liberty or
perhaps even life is at stake.92
While Judge Friot spoke in relatively polite terms, Sullivan notes that others, such as
District Judge James G. Carr from the Northern District of Ohio, do not share his restraint
or gentleness.
I am deeply disturbed that the FBI continues its incomprehensible
policy of not recording interviews. We spent this week for one
reason and one reason only in this case, because the Bureau does
not record interviews. Shame on the Bureau. It makes no sense. It
gives the Bureau an unfair advantage. You come in here in your
coat and tie and say I'm from the F.B.I. and I do not lie, and
everybody believes it. You already come in with an overwhelming
advantage because of the Bureau you work for and the esteem and
respect in which we all hold it, myself included. . . . But you get in
an interrogation room with nobody else except a 20 year old
defendant, and your Bureau sees fit at that moment, the most
crucial moment of any investigation, not to record what he says
and what you say . . . [a]nd that's shameful. It's intolerable in any
society under any government that values the rights of its citizens
to a fair trial. . . . But quite simply, somebody has to tell the
Bureau, there's at least one federal judge in whose estimation the
88
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FBI diminishes when it comes in the courtroom and it says, we
didn't record the statement.93
Sullivan concludes that in view of the judicial and juror preference for recording, as well
as the vast availability of such technology, “federal . . . agents, as well as their
supervisors, have a professional responsibility to make electronic recordings of all
custodial interviews.”94
Somewhat surprisingly, demands for reform are coming not only from outside
academics and judges, but from employees within the F.B.I. itself. In 2006, Special
Agent Brian Parsi Boetig coauthored an article in the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin,
calling for mandatory recordation of interrogations.95 In 2007, Julie Renee Linkins, then a
Juris Doctor candidate at the Georgetown University Law Center and a full-time F.B.I.
employee, published an article urging legislatures, agencies, and courts to require routine
electronic recording of custodial interviews.96 Given the array of voices counseling
against the current F.B.I. non-recordation protocol, the Bureau should, at a minimum,
reexamine its position for the sake of maintaining a favorable public image. In addition to
saving face before an increasingly skeptical legal community, the F.B.I. stands to benefit
from technological efficiency and long-term cost control.
C. Long Term Benefits of Recording Interrogations
The F.B.I. currently maintains fifty-six field offices and over 400 related resident
agencies throughout the United States.97 Undoubtedly, the purchase and implementation

93

Id. at 66.
Id. at 69.
95
Boetig, Vinson & Weidel, supra note 50, at 8.
96
Linkins, supra note 49.
97
See Memorandum from the Fed. Bureau of Investigation Office of Gen. Counsel to all Field Offices at
1629 (Mar. 23, 2006).
94

21

of a video recording system that large would be costly.98 However, considered in light of
the significant long-term savings of both time and money, the initial cash outlay seems
reasonable.
One of the major problems with the lack of recording during interrogations has been
defendants challenging the voluntariness of confessions.99 Mandating recording will
reduce the overall administrative cost of those challenges in two ways. First, defendants
will be less likely to advance dishonest claims of police malfeasance. Therefore, the
Bureau will incur far fewer expenses defending against spurious complaints. Second,
special agents who might otherwise succumb to the temptation of overreaching during
investigations will face inherent accountability via the detailed record.100 In that way, the
new technology will help to both increase overall agency integrity and expedite the
disposition of actual agent misconduct.
Additionally, juries will be greatly assisted in their task of weighing “he said, she
said” testimony regarding disputed confessions. Moreover, by automatically providing
empirical evidence to simplify the judicial task, the F.B.I. can presumably win increased
favor with courts. That should produce a more collegial working environment for agents
and prosecutors alike. It may also secure a more sympathetic and gracious adjudicative
body in instances when procedural missteps inevitably occur.
Finally, investigators would be freed from the distractions of taking handwritten notes
during interviews. The resulting available attention span would allow agents to direct
98
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more immediate focus on a suspect’s statements—including any nonverbal
communication that might be missed while writing. It is far easier to think critically and
analytically about a message when not fettered by the frenetic task of transcription. The
Bureau would assuredly save hundreds of man hours annually by releasing agents from
the burden of further translating their handwritten notes into typewritten reports. By
integrating now-common dictation software with the recording, the entire conversation
could be transcribed in real time.101
D. Preparing for Change
Federal courts agree that due process does not require electronically recorded
interrogations.102 Congress is not currently considering the matter.103 Nonetheless, federal
procedural requirements could change in a moment—either by legislative act or judicial
fiat. As a 2006 edition of the F.B.I. Law Enforcement Bulletin aptly noted: “Each U.S.
law enforcement agency not already electronically recording interrogations is, quite
possibly, only one judicial . . . decision away from the requirement, which could come in
the next session or in 10 years.”104
Strikingly, the Bulletin presumes that mandatory electronic recording is not a question
of if, but when. “Waiting until the law requires [recording], and without knowing when
that time will occur, will prevent agencies from maximizing the many benefits electronic
101
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recording can provide in the interim.”105 Previous Supreme Court reasoning on matters of
due process certainly provides ample justification for such a view. The Court stated in
Miranda that it “has always set high standards of proof for the waiver of constitutional
rights.”106 Requiring electronically recorded proof of Fifth Amendment waivers would
not be an illogical progression of modern jurisprudence.107
Though only fifteen states and the District of Columbia presently require mandatory
recordation, the temperature of public and legislative sentiment might be changing.108
Should a change come suddenly and catch federal law enforcement unprepared, its
immediacy would exacerbate the cost. A better course of action is for the F.B.I. to begin a
measured deployment of mandatory recording now. Not only would this provide the
incremental benefit of the technology during implementation, it would go a long way in
combatting the public perception that the F.B.I. is “slow to adapt.”109 Instead of being the
subject of yet another pejorative headline, the F.B.I. should take the posture of an early
adopter and work to restore its well-deserved reputation for nimbleness, proactivity, and
progressive tactics.
IV. Conclusion
In attempting to achieve a balance between individual liberty and societal safety, a
natural and necessary tension exists. For every unit of individual liberty granted, the state
risks increased vulnerability. Likewise, the state often secures greater measures of
security at the expense of personal freedom. The goal is to preserve a culture free from
105
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both tyranny and terrorism. To accomplish this, courts must allow a reasonable
application of police procedure within the bounds of due process. The Constitution does
not require federal law enforcement to electronically record custodial interrogations.
However, the citizens that such federal agencies are tasked with protecting increasingly
expect technological competency and procedural transparency. Additionally, federal
courts face growing needs for efficiency and predictability. For those reasons, the F.B.I.
should begin implementing systematic video recordation when interrogating suspects. By
doing so, the Bureau may well cede a measure of enforcement control. But that is the
price it must pay to operate effectively in the technological reality of the twenty-first
century. What the F.B.I. loses in control, it will gain in long-term cost savings and public
good will. Analog police practices must adapt to succeed in a digital culture.
American pop-music astutely observed in the early 1980s that “video killed the radio
star.”110 For better or worse, technology’s imperialistic reach continues unabated
throughout modern society, devouring all that it encounters. It leaves none unaffected,
including well-worn and historically respected police practices. Though our Constitution
permits the F.B.I. to continue on its present course, modern prudence beckons a change.

110

THE BUGGLES, Video Killed the Radio Star, on THE AGE OF PLASTIC (Island Records 1980).

25

